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THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RADICAL CHANGE:
HERBERT MARCUSE'S "GREAT REFUSAL"
VS. POLITICAL DUE PROCESS
WILLIAM A. STANMEYER*
"I maintain that there are issues where . . . there is no 'other
side' .....
- Herbert Marcuse
"All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility."
-John Stuart Mill
If for Americans the past decade is historically recorded as the
Revolutionary Sixties, no small credit will be due to the now famous
neo-Hegelian philosopher, Herbert Marcuse.1 If that same decade gains
the paradoxical reputation as the era in which Americans enacted and
violated more laws than in any other decade in their history, a measure
of the credit-or blame- belongs to Professor Marcuse. Marcuse's
influence on the student racial movement and the academic world
is undeniable.2 His major book3 has gone into seven printings in five
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University. Litt. B., Xavier University,
1958; M.A., Loyola University, 1962; J.D., DePaul University, 1966. Appreciation is ex-
pressed to second year law student Marylou Giacomuzzi for research assistance in prepar-
ing this article.
1 Herbert Marcuse, now in his seventies, moved from his Berlin birthplace to Frei-
burg, where in 1922 he completed his formal studies of philosophy and aesthetics and
received his doctorate. After serving as Heidegger's assistant, he joined the Frankfurt In-
stitute of Social Research, where Fromm, Horkheimer, and others were developing a neo-
Marxist and Freudian critique of modern capitalism. Marcuse came to the United States
in 1932 and worked in various research institutes until 1941, at which time he began
a nine-year interlude with the Office of Strategic Services and the Department of State.
In 1954 he began teaching politics and philosophy at Brandeis; presently he is a pro-
fessor of philosophy at the University of California at San Diego.
2 See, e.g., THE CRmcAL SPIr: ESSAYS IN HONOR oF HERBERT MMRCUSE (K. Wolff &
B. Moore eds. 1967 [hereinafter Wolff & Moore]. However, for a view, sub silentio, differ-
ent from that expressed in thd text, regarding his influence on the radical student move-
ment, see THE PoLrrxcs oF PROTEsr (J. Skolnick ed. 1969), which does not mention him
in nearly fifty pages on "Student Protest."
His influence in the academic world appears to be rather uneven, depending on the
political orientation of a given college or department, the age of its instructors, the num-
ber of "activists" on campus, and other variables. That he should have any noticeable
influence at all strikes me as somewhat puzzling, for he has written only one significant
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years. He has been explained, praised, and denounced in popular
journals both liberal4 and conservative, 5 intellectual and business3
Though hardly a "household word" himself, Marcuse and his theories
have been invoked even to illumine the allegedly darker aspects of the
present Administration's attitude toward the media.8 For a time student
revolutionaries on the Continent revered him as the Second Person of
a new Trinity of radicalism.9 Nevertheless, it is fair to assert that outside
certain very narrow circles, his name is unknown and his influence, if
felt, is unrecognized. Perhaps he is nowhere more unknown than in the
world of law, since the work of lawyers as a class is ordinarily quite
different from that of the political theorist. 10 Yet, because Marcuse has
influenced a generation of nascent political activitists and social theorists
to adopt an outlook at odds with traditional notions of law, the values
law protects, and the procedures requisite for civilized change, those
who inhabit the legal world should scrutinize his ideas closely. Ideas do
have consequences.
The sections that follow will sketch Marcuse's thought as drawn
from his works" that bear on this theme, in particular One-Dimensional
Man, his critique of modern industrial society; An Essay on Libera-
tion,12 dealing with techniques of achieving radical change; and Repres-
sive Tolerance, an essay from A Critique of Pure Tolerance.13 Through
copious citations Marcuse will speak for himself whenever possible.
Although in any summary some nuances are necessarily lost, the expo-
work, i.e., ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN (1964) [hereinafter ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN]; and the
weaknesses of his arguments lay him open to devastating critique. See, e.g., Howe, Her-
bert Marcuse or Milovan Djilas?, HARPER's, July 1969, at 4; Vivas, Herbert Marcuse: 'Phi-
losopher' en titre of the New Nihilists, 6 INTER-COLLEGIATE REv. 51 (1969). His influence
may be due to the fact that it is easier to quote him than to understand him, and that
apparently few of his devotees have taken the time to read his critics.
3 ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN.
4 Callahan, Resistance and Technology, 87 COMMONWEAL 377 (1967).
5 Glaser, Marcuse and the German New Left, 20 NAT'L REV. 649 (1968).
6 Peretz, Herbert Marcuse: Beyond Technological Reason, 57 YALE R v. 518 (1968).
This is the best article I have seen which is largely sympathetic.
I Kristol, The Improbable Guru of Surrealistic Politics, 80 FORTUNE, July 1969, at 191.
8 Greenfield, Spiro Agnew: Heresy in High Places, The Washington Post, Nov. 22,
1969, at A-18, col. 3.
9 One-Dimensional Philosopher, TIME, Mar. 22, 1968, at 38 [hereinafter One-Di-
mensional Philosopher]. See also Howe, supra note 2.
101 have suggested elsewhere that lawyers as a class, emerging from the British em-
pirical tradition, are ill-equipped intellectually to cope with movements whose elan re-
sembles that of a continental ideology. See Stanmeyer, The New Left and The Old Law,
55 A.B.AJ. 319 (1969).
11 A comprehensive bibliography of Marcuse's works up to April 1, 1967, appears in
Wolff & Moore, at 427-33.
12 H. MARCUSE, AN ESSAY ON LIBERATION (1969) [hereinafter IBERATION].
13 Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLmANCE 81 (K. Wolff,
B. Moore & H. Marcuse eds. 1969) [hereinafter Repressive Tolerance].
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sition will be as accurate as possible. It should be understood at the
outset that I find the arguments of Burke and Mill and their tradition
far more convincing than Marcuse's and that a vast gulf lies between
them. I will offer some criticisms of Marcuse from the perspective of
that tradition, for not even a radical critic should be immune from
critical commentary.
Part I deals with Marcuse's general position on (a) the repressive
technological society, (b) "liberation" through "negation" and "the
Great Refusal," and (c) the need for "repressive tolerance." Part II
Offers an appreciation in (a) demonstrating the value of negative think-
ing and in (b) some criticisms of his method. Finally, Part III ponders
the need for "rules of the game" in political decision-making and con-
trasts this kind of "due process" with Marcuse's recommendation of
violence. The conclusion contains some comments on bridging that vast
gulf between the evolutionary and the revolutionary.
I
THE REPREssivE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY
Central to Marcuse's thinking is the view that contemporary tech-
nological society - generally the West and specifically the United States
- is both totalitarian and irrational. For "totalitarian" means not only
a terroristic political coordination of society, but also a non-terroristic
economic-technical coordination wherein vested interests manipulate
human needs and "thus preclude[s] the emergence of an effective opposi-
tion against the whole."'14 Moreover, "this society is irrational as a
whole."' 5 Its productivity destroys free development of human faculties
and fulfillment of human needs; its peace is maintained by the constant
threat of war. People suffer under "aggressive business practices which
turn ever more spaces of protective nature into a medium of commercial
fulfillment and fun" and thus both "offend beauty" and "repress bio-
logical necessities."'16 The individual in the affluent society bends under
"strains and stresses ... grounded in the normal functioning of this
society.., rather than in its disturbances and diseases."' 7 This society
is sick.'8
The need for possessing, consuming, handling, and constantly re-
newing the gadgets, devices, instruments, engines, offered to and
14 ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 3.
i5 Id. at ix.
is H. MAa os, NEATinos: EssAYs IN C amcAL THEORy 267 (1968) [hereinafter NrWA-
TIONS].
17 Id. at 249.
18As a tentative definition of "sick .society" we can say that a society is sick when
19701
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imposed upon the people, for using these wares even at the danger
of one's own destruction, has become a "biological" need.19
"The established universe of discourse is that of an unfree world";20
one experiences a "radical falsity [in] the established forms of life.' 21
By apparently providing for man's every want, society has deadened his
critical faculties: "the increasing comforts of life and the ubiquitous
power of the productive apparatus keep man enslaved to the prevailing
state of affairs." 22 We inhabit a society which is both totally adminis-
tered and overdeveloped, which creates artificial waste in order to
maintain specious affluence, which fosters "positive thinking" not
through terror but by overwhelming, anonymous power and efficiency. 23
In flattening opposition, in absorbing the Other, the media as well en-
gage in maintaining the "one-dimensional" society: they stifle the
mind's quest for alternatives and help make liberty itself an instrument
of domination. "Free election of masters does not abolish the masters or
the slaves." 24
its basic institutions and relations, its structure, are such that they do not permit
the use of the available material and intellectual resources for the optimal de-
velopment and satisfaction of individual needs.
Id. at 251.
19 LIBERATION I.
2 0 H. MARCUSE, REASON AND REvOLUTION: HEGEL AND THE RISE OF SOCIAL THEORY xii
(1960) [hereinafter REASON AND REVOLUTION].
21 Id. at xiii.
22 Id. at xiv. Cf. ONE-DIMENsIONAL MAN 8, noting the "flattening out of the contrast
(or conflict) between the given and the possible, between the satisfied and the unsatisfied
needs."
23 ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 226. "Positive thinking" has a technical meaning. It has
overtones of philosophical positivism, which Marcuse strongly opposes and forcefully crit-
icizes. See id. at 144-69. He sees it as basically a philosophical movement "which under-
took to subordinate reason to the authority of established fact." REASON AND REVOLUTION
xv. This attitude leads to an uncritical acceptance of the status quo and a blindness to
the possibilities of alternatives. See also NEGATIONS 134-58.
24 ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 7. The "absorption of the negative by the 'positive' is
discussed at 226 et seq.
Other commentators have gleaned essentially the same message. Martin Peretz, supra
note 6, summarizes as follows:
Business and labor, advertiser and consumer, each has a stake in the perpetua-
tion of the present. How pointless then, the old philosophic gambits of is and
ought, of being and becoming! What Marcuse finds so striking and so com-
promising are the equivalent implications of other intellectual disciplines. So-
ciology studies the conditions securing consensus; psychology probes for refined
techniques of inducing adjustment; economics purports to be neutral engineer-
ing; the arts are smugly devoid of ennobling aspiration .... [TMhe guilt of the
intellectuals [consists of] envisioning no alternatives to the present....
Id. at 522. And he adds that
poverty amidst plenty, elaborately preserved formal liberties carefully emptied
of substance, an ethic of work undermining the free leisure momentum of auto-
mation, an economy of waste and obsolescence, the recurrence of wars and of
military interventions, these are not for him [Marcuse] blemishes on the facade
of the system gradually to be eliminated with time; they are of the system's es-
sence and in keeping with its logic.
Id. at 523.
See also Cohen, The Norman Vincent Peale of the Left, ATLANTIC, June 1969, at 108;
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Many of these value-laden sociological judgments have been sug-
gested before. 25 Marcuse's originality lies partly in his attempt to cast
them into a mold drawn from Hegel, Marx and Freud; and largely in
his candid appraisal of what must be done about them. The latter point
bears directly on an area of inquiry where jurisprudence and social
philosophy overlap: the role of law in organizing a humane society.2
Implicit through Marcuse's diagnosis of society is a view of law.
For him, law is an instrument of the hyper-stable society itself, a means
of preserving the status quo and cloaking its resistance to change in the
garb of legitimacy. In this view he departs little from Marx, whose
remark about bourgeois jurisprudence 27 expressed the doctrine that all
subsequent revolutionaries marching under his banner have preached.
Though not in overall outlook, Marcuse has moved away from Marx in
significant details, both in his unhesitant admission that no longer is a
single "class," the bourgeoisie, at fault -he substitutes the techno-
logical organization as a whole, in which the workers acquiesce as well
- and in his conviction that radical new beginnings must occur equally
in such hitherto politically irrelevant fields as linguistics and general
culture. 28 Marcuse sees little that is truly liberating in the present role
of law in our lives (and here too he may be influenced by the Marxian
postulate that ultimately, after the purgative period of proletarian dic-
tatorship, the State and its laws will "wither away"); indeed, he would
probably regard law and "liberation" as antithetical. It is hardly
strange, therefore, that he recommends actions which depart from the
Howe, supra note 2; Vivas, supra note 2. The flippant titles given to some popular articles
on Marcuse should not be allowed to obscure the seriousness with which he writes and
his devotees follow him. For a serious appraisal, see Stern, The Metaphysics of Rebel-
lion, 6 RA MPARs 55 (1967).
25 Marcuse himself acknowledges his debt to C. Wright Mills, Vance Packard, Wil-
liam H. Whyte, and Fred J. Cook. ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN xvii. He adds a theoretical
analysis. His merger of Hegel with popularized sodology has been noted in Stillman,
Marcuse, HoRIZON, Summer 1969, at 26. After naming the forementioned writers: "Mar-
cuse is the reverse of a popularizer-one who makes abstruse thinking accessible to the
masses. Marcuse takes popular doctrine and cloaks it in ideology and dense prose." Id. at
31. Despite this jibe, this article is the best serious piece that I have seen in the popular
press which shows the philosophical, historical and even theological influences on Mar-
cuse.
26 Consider the relation of his book, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry
into Freud, written in 1955, to its "Political Preface," written in 1966.
27 But don't wrangle with us so long as you apply, to our intended abolition of
bourgeois property, the standard of your bourgeois notions of freedom, culture,
law, etc. Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bour-
geois production and bourgeois property, just as your jurisprudence is but the
will of your class made into a law for all, a will, whose essential character and
direction are determined by the economic conditions of existence of your class.
K. MARx, Tim C6MeuNI=r MAmrsro 47 (Gateway ed. 1965) (emphasis added).
28 Cf. A Biological Foundation for Socialism?, in LtBEAIION 8-20, & 73.
1970]
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law-imposed norms.29 To see why such departure is a means to libera-
tion, one must understand the premise: liberation, the goal of social
life, means the fulfillment of individual desires and potentiality as
autonomously articulated. However, law helps impose that crushing
cultural uniformity which inhibits autonomous choice; thus law con-
tributes to the withering of freedom.
At the very outset of One-Dimensional Man Marcuse suggests a
startling notion of freedom: "The rights and liberties which were such
vital factors in the origins and earlier stages of industrial society yield
to a higher stage of this society: they are losing their traditional ratio-
nale and content."8 0 Freedom of thought, speech and conscience were
"essentially critical ideas, designed to replace an obsolescent material
and intellectual culture by a more productive and rational one." But
now that they are institutionalized, they have lost their critical thrust.81
It follows that to achieve "a radical transvaluation of values" 32 the
present forms of freedom must be negated; in fact, the only way to
achieve true liberation from the false consciousness that so permeates
our society is "total rejection of the existing society, of its entire value
system. '33 The popular majority's opinion is generated by the dominant
interests in the status quo; consequently "the general will is always
wrong";3 4 and "if democracy means self-government of free people, with
justice for all, then the realization of democracy would presuppose
abolition of the existing pseudo-democracy."3 5 The opposition that must
arise cannot share the same premises of this system or be willing to
work for piecemeal reform, for then it too would finally be co-opted
and absorbed into the one-dimensional society; rather, what is needed
29 Id. at 67-73. See also Repressive Tolerance at 81. The entire essay is an exhortation
to depart from traditional norms, especially of freedom of speech.
30 ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 1.
31 The problem of the fossilization of revolutionary fervor once it becomes "estab-
lished" may be more a fact of human psychology than an attribute of an idea, such as
freedom. The secularization of the Christian Church, once Emperor Constantine made it
the Roman Empire's official religion, is perhaps one historical example. Mflovan Djilas
has observed the same phenomenon infecting the communist movement. M. DjILAs, Tm
NEw CLASS 152 (Praeger ed. 1964).
82 LmERAMoN 6. "Such a practice involves a break with the familiar, the routine ways
of seeing, hearing, feeling, understanding things. ... ." Id. "To the degree to which the
rebellion is directed against a functioning, prosperous, 'democratic' society, it is a moral
rebellion, against the hypocritical, aggressive values and goals .. . of this society.
Id. at 62.
a3ld. at 58. He describes "today's rebels" who have "libertarian aspirations" which
"appear as the negation of the traditional culture. . . ." Id. at 46. Earlier, he describes
with the fervor of the advocate, the "struggle . . .waged for essentially new ways and
forms of life: negation of the entire Establishment, its morality, culture .. " Id. at 25.
841d. at 65. The general will is wrong because "it objectively counteracts the possible
transformation of society into more humane ways of life."
35 Id.
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is "an opposition which is directed, not against a particular form of
government or against particular conditions within society, but against
a given social system as a whole ..... -8 He develops the preconditions
for this opposition in An Essay onLiberation.
"THE GREAT REFUSAL": LIBERATION THROUGH NEGATION
In discussing "the present meaning of Liberalism," George H.
Sabine states that "a crucial characteristic and perhaps the most impor-
tant characteristic of a liberal government is the negative quality of not
being totalitarian,"37 and that its goal is "first and foremost ... to regu-
larize public reflection and discussion, and the weighing of contrary
claims to the end of evolving a workable policy."38s This is done, he
asserts, by institutions which promote a maximum of opportunity for
human wisdom, which "consists less in certainty than in a built-in
corrigibility." 39 And when Mill inquires what accounts for the fact that
most people hold rational opinions and exhibit rational conduct, he
answers that "it is owing to a quality of the human mind... that as a
moral being, [a man's] errors are corrigible."40
It is precisely these two features which Marcuse vehemently denies
exist in modem society; for it is totalitarian - and thus it is no longer
corrigible.41 Therefore non-parliamentary means must be utilized; in
sum, these comprise the Great Refusal.4M 2 He teaches that the resistance
must take place in life style, in language, in action; that to create "a
realm of freedom which is not that of the present ... necessitates an
historical break with the past and present."43 He believes that a rational
organization of the technical and technological forces of advanced
capitalism and socialism "would terminate poverty and scarcity within
a very foreseeable future," 44 but only if the rebellion takes root in the
36Id. at 66. For a discussion of the implications of acting "against a given social
system as a whole," see text accompanying notes 46-57 infra.
37 G. SABiNE, A HsroRy OF PoLIcAL THEORY 751 (3d ed. 1962).
88 Id. at 752.
89 Id. at 753.
40 J. MILL, ON LBERTY 28 (Regnery ed. 1955).
41 "The democratic process ... is discredited to such an extent that no part of it
can be extracted which is not contaminated. Moreover, using this process would divert
energy to snail-paced movements." IBERATiON 63.
42 LIBERATION ix; ONE-DImENSIONAL MAN xiv & 257; REASON AND REVOLUrON xi.
43 IDBERATION viii. Query: The law having been made in the past, and preserving
past values and modes of conduct in the present, does this position mandate rejection of
the legal order, not for any "dishonest" purpose but for purposes of breaking the histor-
ical continuity and thus symbolically placing oneself over-and-against (gegenstand) the
established order?
44 ONE-DimE.NsioNAL MAN 4. But this can occur only through "collective ownership,
collective control and planning of the means of production and distribution." IBERATON
87. I return to the problem of central planning at note 96 infra.
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very nature of the individual man and a qualitative change occurs in the
needs - in the infrastructure, as it were - of social man himself. Such
a "biological" transformation can come about "only through a political
practice of methodical disengagement from and refusal of the Establish-
ment," and with a touch of the prophet condemning Sodom and Gomor-
rah, he adds that those who join in the Refusal "[must] reject the rules
of the game that is rigged against them, the ancient strategy of patience
and persuasion, the reliance on the Good Will in the Establishment, its
false and immoral comforts, its cruel affluence."45 Though "radical po-
litical practice involves a cultural subversion" 46 - by redefining words
like "obscene" to mean the hypocrisies of the present society, by turn-
ing morality against the Establishment - it "is affirmative in that it
envisages a new culture which fulfills the humanistic promises betrayed
by the old culture." 47 Since the populace has an almost organic adapta-
tion to this terrible but profitably functioning society, they "cannot
reject the system of domination without rejecting themselves. '48 Thus,
"we would have to conclude that liberation would mean subversion
against the will and against the prevailing interests of the great majority
of the people. '49 Marcuse envisions a new type of man: controlling his
own destiny, leisured, freed of injustice through "human relationships
no longer mediated by the market, no longer based on competitive
exploitation or terror."5 Marcuse recognizes, as do many of his follow-
ers, the educational value of physical action as a means of creating a
new attitude; the beginning of radical change in consciousness, he says,
is a period of enlightenment prior to material change, "a period of
education ... which turns into praxis: demonstration, confrontation,
rebellion." 51
Marcuse has raised a problem in the legal system which is rarely
touched in law schools: the relation between underlying values and




48 Id. at 17.
49 Id.
SO Id. at 27, 46.
But the construction of such a society presupposes a type of man with a different
sensitivity as well as consciousness: men who would speak a different language,
have different gestures, follow different impulses; men who have developed an
instinctual barrier against cruelty, brutality, ugliness.
Id. at 21. Again, "the radical transformation of society implie& the union of the new
sensibility with a new rationality." Id. at 37. "[R]adical change in consciousness is the
beginning, the first step in changing social existence: emergence of the new Subject." Id.
at 53.
51 ld. at 53. Cf. Repressive Tolerance at 101.
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society and that society's public understanding of itself. However stated,
the polarities suggest a tension that law alone cannot quite resolve.
Although law needs public acceptance and a measure of individual
commitment to insure compliance, it cannot effectively command a
general commitment. It can, in a word, command certain acts -but
not a willingness to perform those acts. Commitment to certain proc-
esses of resolving disputes, allocating resources, making decisions, insur-
ing that change brings progress, and withal, maintaining a living dia-
logue between governing and governed - popular commitment to, or
at least acquiescence in, the legal institutions of society is essential for
their effective functioning.52
This society has taken its institutions for granted.53 They have
worked tolerably well, quite well compared to other systems attempted
in other societie Until the last decade, the winds of revolutionary
change that might shake domestic institutions not firmly anchored in
popular acceptance did not blow across our country, so that whatever
gaps separated underlying mores, morals, worldview or ideology on the
one hand, and social arrangements, public laws, and official practice on
the other were hardly noticed. Since everyone shared - or seemed to
share - the same underlying values, a public consensus on means"4
generally (as well as on a wide range of ends), everyone took those
values for granted. The deep differences were largely over method or
degree within the system; as Marcuse would say, a matter of quantity
and not quality Marcuse popularized -among a certain constituency
- the truth that the relationship between legal system and underlying
values is one of interdependence. Since they support one another, a
person can attack one by attacking the other. Accordingly, the "histor-
ical break with the past and present" becomes both a self-induced alien-
ation from popular mores and habits and a similar isolation from the
influence of accepted legal processes It is thus a rooting out of the im-
plicit commitment to social rules tfiat carries on in human psychology
even after explicit commitment has been permitted to atrophy. When
one "refuses" involvement with "the System," he engages in a kind of
52 See C. HYNEMAN & C. GILBERT, POPULAR GovmmNiENT IN AmrICA 287 (1968): "Rules
that limit the behavior of an aggressive society cannot be made effective by display of
governmental authority alone; there must be voluntary adherence to the rules [as well]."
63 See C. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HisroIucAL P ERSPEacrv 149 (1963):
The more generally the existing foundation of the social order is accepted, as
was the case in the United States until recently and in Europe during the nine-
teenth century, the more law can be treated as if it were only a compromise
of existing interests -the reason being that the deeper foundations, the "funda-
mental agreements," are not questioned.
54 See J. MuRAY, WE HoLD TH=sE TRuTHs chs. 1-5 (1961).
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reverse-rehabilitation process, the goal now being to leave the "square"
world psychologically - a world, incidentally, which takes the norm to
be the "law-abiding" and which structures such myriad social relations
through law, both criminal and civil, that a shortcut to self-alienation
from that world is to clash with its laws. Attack the legal system -
whether through ridicule, purposeless violation, or pressure on author-
ities to abdicate - and one strikes at the values and attitudes it
reinforces. Or one may reverse the direction of his sortie and use
Marcuse's "cultural subversion" - symbolic acts, a life-style that ridi-
cules inherited social arrangements, the "new morality" or linguistic
perversion - as a rear guard assault on the legal system, of which the
traditional norms and values are spirit and life. Marcuse notes the
relation:
Even the most totalitarian technocratic-political administra-
tion depends, for its functioning, on what is usually called the
"moral fiber": .... A society depends on the relatively stable and
calculable sanity of the people.... Moreover, a society also demands
to a considerable extent, belief in one's beliefs (which is part of the
required sanity); belief in the operative value of society's values.55
The original Marxist theory expected the working class to be driven
to a growing consciousness of their alienation and the oppressive pur-
pose of bourgeois law and values; this awareness would presage revolu-
tion. Capitalism's resilience, however, blunted the proletariat's revolu-
tionary fervor; thus, Marcuse suggests that history has handed the torch
of negative thinking to ghetto dwellers and the student population, who
have "the common ground [of] the total rejection of the existing society,
of its entire value system."56 In a style reportorial but with a tone
hortatory, Marcuse in effect calls upon both groups to reject the polit-
ical process because liberal-parliamentary democracy is a sham; the
politicians are irrelevant; the courts do nothing to mitigate popular
distrust; the system not only takes too long but it is also so discredited
that its every part is contaminated.57 As the rejection is of the social
55 LmERATION 83-84. When these values break down, and only then, he says, will the
"political climate ... prevail" for new forms of struggle.
56 Id. at 58. As staging ground for the student movement, the university receives gen-
eral demands for educational reform which are, Marcuse says, "only the immediate ex-
pression of wide and more fundamental aims." Id. at 59.
57 Id. at 63. The condemnation is elaborate and forceful. It is instructive to juxtapose
the ideas about the legal system, the courts in particular, and the need for "radical re-
form" offered by legal scholar and practicing attorney John Frank who, unlike Professor
Marcuse, has had vast experience with the topic of his critique. See J. FRANK, AMERCAN
LAw: THE CASE FOR RADIcAL RE.Faoa (1969), which moves far beyond the thundering
generalities in the passage just cited, to point out precisely what is wrong and to offer
specific recommendations. Cf. John P. Frank -Radical Judicial Reform Symposium, 47
[VOL. 45:1
JURISPRUDENCE AND RADICAL CHANGE
system as a whole, it is impossible not to breach legality, for all
enforceable laws only serve the status quo, and "those who refuse such
service are eo ipso outside the realm of law even before they come into
actual conflict with the law." 58 By using Law and Order as a counter-
revolutionary force, the system of corporate capitalism presses the radical
opposition into direct action and uncivil disobedience. Indoctrinated
and self-perpetuating, the majority are open to changes within, but not
beyond, the institutionalized social system; the radical must either
surrender to the power of the status quo or violate the law and order of
the status quo.59
Marcuse is aware of the objection that to set oneself up as judge of
a legally constituted society in place of the official representatives and
the majority of the people is to opt for a self-appointed elite. He notes
further that between democracy and dictatorship - even "benevolent"
dictatorship - democracy is certainly preferable. He insists, however,
that such a democracy does not exist; rather, we have a network of
pressure groups, "machines," vested interests which control democratic
institutions.0° To exchange these ruling minorities for an elite "would
only mean replacement of the present ruling elite by another . ..
[which] may not be less qualified and less threatening than the prevail-
ing one." 61 The positive, codified right of existing society clashes with
the negative, unwritten human right of transcendence - a standoff, he
implies. And the standoff is not broken by criticizing the radical for
violence when "violence is built into the very structure of this society."' 2
Especially when one ponders the horror of our foreign policy, he con-
tends, "the traditional distinction between legitimate and illegitimate
violence becomes questionable."'63 "Law and Order" are indeed neces-
sary, but in the present situation "law and order become something to
TEcAs L. Rv. 965 (1969). The gap between the mountaintop of theory and the market-
place of practice is made greater by Marcuse's unfortunate habit of anathematizing the
unknown. Compare the field of business, note 94 infra.
58 LaRATION 67.
59 Id. at 69-70.
60 Robert Paul Wolff, colleague of Marcuse, argues the failure of pluralism in Be-
yond Tolerance, another essay in A CRIrIQuE OF PuRE TorxaMrcz, supra note 13, at 36.
For a more profound appraisal of the need for pluralism, see R. NisBEr, CoMIUNrrY AM
PowER 265-69, 283-84 (1962). Of this book, Adolf Berle comments that pages 140 to 180
"ought to be required reading for those currently attracted by the thinking of Herbert
Marcuse. . . ." A. BERi.E, PowER 573 (1969).
61 I ERATION 70.
62 Id. at 75. "[Als the accumulated aggressiveness which drives the business of life
in all branches of corporate capitalism, as the legal aggression on the highways, and as
the national aggression abroad .... Id. at 75-76 (emphasis added). The use of analogy
to presume a point to be proved is discussed in the text accompanying notes 101-07 infra.
63 Id. at 76.
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be established as against the established law and order: the existing
society has become illegitimate, unlawful: it has invalidated its own
law."M4
"REPREssIvE TOLERANCE" AND THE GREAT REFUSAL
In A Critique of Pure Tolerance, Professor Marcuse contributed an
essay entitled "Repressive Tolerance," which is generally viewed as the
epitome of his thinking about the Great Refusal, as well as a frontal
attack on the tradition of Burke and Mill regarding the method of
change in a free society.
Marcuse advances the paradoxical observation that "what is pro-
claimed and practiced as tolerance today, is in many of its most effective
manifestations serving the cause of repression.""5 Because of the basic-
ally oppressive character of the status quo, tolerance is extended to
conditions and modes of behavior which should not be tolerated be-
cause they impede liberation. Worse still, "within a repressive society,
even progressive movements [i.e., movements of radical negation]
threaten to turn into their opposite to the degree to which they accept
the rules of the game."06' Tolerance is of two kinds: passive toleration of
entrenched and established attitudes and ideas (even if their damaging
effect is evident), and active or official tolerance of the Right as well as
of the Left. The second form, "pure tolerance," is non-partisan, but its
neutrality "actually protects the already established machinery of dis-
crimination."6 7 The goal of struggle is to create a society wherein "man
is no longer enslaved by institutions which vitiate self-determination
from the beginning," for "freedom" does not yet exist; it "is still to be
created."68 The standard, the effectuation of liberation, therefore, "can-
not be indiscriminate and equal with respect to the contents of ex-
pression. . . . [I]t cannot protect false words and wrong deeds which
demonstrate that they contradict and counteract the possibilities of
liberation." The rationale of free speech and assembly was that men
64 Id. at 78. Thus, by a different route Marcuse has arrived at the same conclusion
as Marx. See note 28 supra.
65 Repressive Tolerance at 83.
66 Id. at 83-84.
To take a most controversial case: the exercise of political rights (such as voting,
letter-writing to the press, to Senators, etc., protest-demonstrations with a priori
renunciation of counterviolence) in a society of total administration serves to
strengthen this administration by testifying to the existence of democratic liber-
ties which, in reality, have changed their content and lost their effectiveness. In
such a case, freedom (of opinion, of assembly, of speech) becomes an instrument
for absolving servitude.
67 Id. at 85.
68 Id. at 87.
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were individuals who could come to reasonable positions on their own,
but since this supposition for universal toleration no longer obtains -
men are now manipulated and indoctrinated - the indiscriminate guar-
anty of political rights actually turns out to be repressive. Thus toler-
ance itself is questionable. 69 Dominating through technology, this
society can condescend to permit the appearance of freedom to opposi-
tion movements, because the overwhelming majority, secure in the
increasing satisfaction of needs, militates against qualitative social
change and sees to it that the radicals do not really change anything.70
Consequently, it allows all points of view: Left and Right, white and
Negro, crusaders for a-ament and for disarmament. Throughout the
babble of competing voices "the people" are supposed to decide; yet the
unspoken condition precedent to the success of democratic argument is
that they have access to authentic information and are capable of
autonomous thought. In our present era, however, "the democratic
argument for abstract tolerance tends to be invalidated by the invalida-
tion of the democratic process itself."71 The apparent objectivity of the
media fosters, in a totalitarian democracy, a mental attitude which
obliterates distinctions between true and false, between information and
indoctrination. In order to break out of the established universe of
meaning, this deceptive impartiality must be abandoned, the prevailing
indoctrination offset, and the trend reversed: the people "would have
to get information slanted in the opposite direction.172 To open up the
ways by which a subversive majority could develop "may require
69Id. at 88, 90-91. Marcuse states: "The antagonistic structure of society rigs the rules
of the game. Those who stand against the established system are a priori at a disadvan-
tage, which is not removed by the toleration of their ideas, speeches, and newspapers."
Id. at 92 (emphasis added).
Unless this is an objection against having rules at all, it should be apparent that this
burden falls equally on every party or person who would change the status quo- includ-
ing even those who would change the status quo in San Diego by imposing mandatory
retirement on professors who are beyond retirement age but continue to teach. That
Marcuse benefits by society's rules of the game against self-help "repressive tolerance"
exercised by a populace resentful of his revolutionary message is suggested indirectly in
Legion vs. Marcuse, 207 THE NATION 421 (1968); Gold, Mao, Marx et Marcuse! Saturday
Evening Post, Oct. 19, 1968, at 56. The irony of escaping repression through the protec-
tion of the "repressive society's" legal forms is lost on him.
70 Repressive Tolerance at 94.
711d. at 95.
72 Id. at 99. He asserts that such a recommendation does not amount to espousal of
a dictatorship; for despite its limitations and distortions, democratic tolerance is always
more humane than the institutionalized intolerance of a dictatorship. But he states there
is a third alternative other than dictatorship and our present democracy: to change this
society to make it truly democratic. He does not discuss prior twentieth-century experi-
ments in "slanting" information in the direction a ruling elite thinks best for the people,
nor does he explain how his proposal would differ from the work of the Ministry of Truth
in Orwell's 1984.
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apparently undemocratic means," which "would include the withdrawal
of toleration of speech and assembly from groups and movements which
promote aggressive policies, armament, chauvinism, discrimination on
the grounds of race and religion, or which oppose the extension of
public services, social security, medical care, etc.," and "may necessitate
new and rigid restrictions on teachings and practices in the educational
institutions. . ...73
This position, he continues, entails reexamining the traditional
distinction between violent and nonviolent action, for in terms of its
historical function there is a difference between revolutionary and
reactionary violence. The natural question - Who makes the judgment
between the two kinds of violence and by what standards? - can have
only one logical answer: everyone who has learned to think rationally
and autonomously - a number, in an indoctrinated society, that would
be quite small and not necessarily the people's elected representatives.
The historical record reveals that violence from below, by the oppressed
masses, leads to progress in civilization, and that one can anticipate
whether a violent "movement would serve the revamping of the old
order or the emergence of the new." 74
Liberating tolerance, then, would mean intolerance against
movements from the Right, and toleration of movements from the
Left. As to [its] scope: it would extend to the stage of action as well
as of discussion and propaganda, of deed as well as of word. The
traditional criterion of clear and present danger seems no longer
adequate where the whole society is ... in a period [of] clear and
present danger.75
Our whole society being in extreme danger, an extreme suspension of
the rights of free speech and assembly is justified: tolerance should be
withdrawn before the deed, at the stage of communication in word or
art form. The deterioration of democracy has proceeded so far that
false consciousness has become the general consciousness; the only
remedy is "withdrawal of tolerance from regressive movements before
they can become active; intolerance even toward thought, opinion, and
word," for "I maintain that there are issues where either there is no
'other side' in any more than a formalistic sense, or where 'the other
78 Id. at 100.
74 Id. at 108-09.
75 Id. at 109. The reference is to Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919),
wherein Mr. Justice Holmes enunciated the classic test of free speech hindrance:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circum-
stances and are of such a nature as to create a dear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is
a question of proximity and degree."
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side' is demonstrably 'regressive' and impedes possible improvement of
the human condition." 76
II
AN EVALUATION: THE POWER OF NEGATIVE THINKING
John Stuart Mill observed sagely that "it is the fashion . . . to
disparage negative logic -that which points out weaknesses in theory
or errors in practice, without establishing positive truths."77 Marcuse's
thought is "negative," in the metaphysical sense:78 in both epistemo-
logical theory and political practice one moves to truth by grasping, in
the first instance, the falsity of the given. The Hegelian dialectic, with
its many levels of application and subtlety, is not the customary method
of thought in the English-speaking West, but it has guided Marcuse to
some conclusions that deserve a hearing; his many-sided analysis may
well prompt agreement on individual points without acceptance of the
entirety. Such an acceptance may well be impossible for a person operat-
ing out of the tradition of Burke and Mill, simply because of the gulf
separating the "spiritual universe" of British empiricism from that of
Continental ideology. Or it may be, as this paper will argue, because of
Marcuse's insufficient familiarity with important societal institutions,
such as law and business, and the disturbing implications of his recom-
mendations about means to achieve his ends.7 9
No quarrel need ensue, however, if one begins by adverting to
some affirmative aspects of Marcuse's negative thinking. As a theoreti-
cian whose thought process is geared to transcendence, he has little
patience with philosophical positivism, which, he believes, artificially
narrows one's perspective to the "is" while excluding the "ought" -
the alternative - which is beyond the grasp of empirical method or
7" Repressive Tolerance at 110, 120. The latter appears in a Postscript to the essay,
written in 1968.
77 J. MuL, supra note 40, at 64.
78 See note 21 supra.
79 To those who take issue with Marcuse there is a convenient rejoinder. See One-
Dimensional Philosopher at 40, wherein the author states that "[t]o most criticisms, Mar-
cuse smilingly answers that his intellectual opponents are simply one-dimensional pris-
oners of the system." Marcuse's method of ansvering in advance the objection that his
ideas are utopian appears as follows: "The unrealistic sound of these propositions is
indicative, not of their utopian character, but of the strength of the forces which pre-
vent their realization." ONE-DI ENSIONAL MN 4.
The weakness of this kind of rebuttal is that it smacks of the ad hominem attack and
presumes what must be proved- that the "system" "imprisons" men intellectually, and
sets the stage for a similar counterattack: that Marcuse himself is a "prisoner"- of ide-
ology. Whatever the merits of this debate technique, it is still true that even if Marcuse
were right about all the evils of "the system," that fact alone does not prove that his al-
ternative would be any better.
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expression in "operational terms" but is nonetheless real. Emphatic that
if any style of thought is "one-dimensional," this is, Marcuse argues that
one of positivism's contemporary offspring, analytic philosophy, trivial-
izes philosophy and cosmic problems by a nit-picking method that
refuses to attend to anything but simple, everyday sentences and situa-
tions. His particular insight is to focus on the connection between
philosophical positivism and societal resistance-to-change. He believes
positivism's flattening out of the world of meaning and alternatives in
thought is the philosophical counterpart of a similar emasculation
rampant in people's psychology, politics, and social relations. They
accept the given as the right. They surrender to a self-validating system.
Thus they lose the power - even in thought - to stand outside it and
challenge it in terms of alternatives. They demean themselves by ac-
quiescing to the positivist truncation of the philosopher's witness, which
is to stand over-and-against the irrational while subjecting it to the
scrutiny of reason.80 One can sense Marcuse's horror at the positivist
renunciation of theory as he recoils from "Bishop Butler's pronounce-
ment which adorns G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica: 'Everything is what
it is, and not another thing?' "81 - even as Hegel would be horrified -
or as he notes that neopositivism sets up a comfortable "reservation"
for certain modes of thought, thereby insulating "the normal universe
of discourse from being seriously disturbed by unfitting ideas":82
The neo-positivist critique still directs its main effort against
metaphysical notions, and it is motivated by a notion of exactness
which is either that of formal logic or empirical description.
Whether exactness is sought in the analytic purity of logic and
mathematics, or in conformity with ordinary language- on both
poles of contemporary philosophy is the same rejection or deval-
uation of those elements of thought and speech which transcend
the accepted system of validation .8..
and are set aside - segregated? - as "poetic" or "metaphysical."
Admittedly, Marcuse is far from the first to question the adequacy
of positivism. 4 Nor is he original in his concern about the dehumaniza-
80 The positivist "analysis abstracts from the negative, from that which is alien and
antagonistic and cannot be understood in terms of the established usage.... In barring
access to this realm [of knowledge beyond common sense and formal logic], positivist
philosophy sets up a self-suffident world of its own, dosed and well protected against the




84 From quite a different perspective, Professor Lon L. Fuller attacked positivism
in jurisprudence. See L. FULLER, THE LAw IN QUESr OF ITSELF (1940). The argument that
ensued is traced, with citations from contemporary positivist jurists, in Fuller, A Reply
to Critics, in THE MORALITY OF LAw 187-242 (rev. ed. 1969).
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tion of man in the technological society.85 But he has shown originality
in combining an attack on the general philosophical underpinnings of
a society with a prophet's wrath at its practical excesses 86 Moreover, as
any prophet, his mission is essentially normative rather than descrip-
tive. He arrived on the scene at a time when many students and young
intellectuals have become disenchanted with logical positivism pushed
to - shall we say? - its logical conclusion, either in sterile analysis of
words and simple sentences in the classroom or in the piecemeal reform
of societal institutions that leaves them in essence as they were. He
offered a normative critique quite heady compared to the intellectual
pablum they feel has heretofore been their diet. Students for a Demo-
cratic Society and other radical protest groups are essentially normative:
they stand outside the accepted scheme of things in order to criticize it,
to distinguish clearly the is from the ought, and to assert that the latter
is both knowable and attainable.87 By pounding his many theses of dis-
sent on the university door, Marcuse resembles Luther striking at the
"established" system, which in his day bound theological thought and
religious practice; or an intellectual Moses leading his people across
a spiritual desert where they must create "new forms" of social life as
the price for redemption of the class they represent - the "disinherited
of the earth" - in the promised land, which for Marcuse will be the
unrepressive, technologically abundant, classless society. To avoid stag-
nation, every society needs its prophets.
Lawyers especially owe a certain debt to a prophet like Marcuse.
Busy tending the machinery of society, we often fail to ask where the
machine is going; complacent in that successful daily conflict-resolution
which Marcuse so roundly condemns, we rarely consider the ethical im-
plications of the system as a whole. Skilled at utilizing the democratic
process, we scarcely consider the need for commitment, values, and
underlying consensus. We write elaborate scholarly briefs on narrow
points within the legal system; but few of us have bothered to compose
a brief that would prove the value of the system itself to the dissenter.
If "political due process" is the soul of Western legal thought, Marcuse's
student followers, under his tutelage, have drawn up an indictment
85 See note 25 supra. This theme is so commonplace today that citation is hardly
necessary. Nevertheless, at least passing reference is owed to a Continental philosopher
whose "feel" for the human condition is extraordinarily sensitive. See G. MNARcEL, MAN
AGAINST MASS Socirry (1962).
86 See Stilhman, supra note 25.
87For interesting comments about Marcuse and Continental student protest groups,
see Cranston, Neocommunism and the Students' Revolts, 1 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE CoM-
mumsm, July-October 1968, at 40. This is an interdisciplinary journal published quarterly
by the School of Politics and International Relations, University of Southern California.
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with its chief count the accusation that the system is a Frankenstein. In
effect, they say, "Prove that it needs a soul - and has one."
AN EVALUATION: THE LIMITS OF NEGATIVE THOUGHT
Before an examination of the indictment itself, a discussion of how
it is reached is in order. A careful reading of Marcuse's analysis raises
grave doubts about its adequacy. These doubts cluster around four
main themes: first, his lack of experience with the processes he so con-
fidently condemns; second, the rhetorical device of redefining words to
"prove" an otherwise controverted point; third, his utopianism; and
fourth, the facile transfer of Hegelian dialectic from the conceptual
domain of thought to the real world of society.
The pervasive question is whether Marcuse carries the burden of
proof. We must ask whether he has proved beyond a reasonable doubt
the guilt of the political-legal system so that the verdict of the death
penalty should indeed be rendered. In order to comprehend how cru-
cial this evidentiary question is, we must clearly understand, at the out-
set, what the issue is and where the burden of proof lies. As to the
former question, at stake is not a given objectional practice in American
society - say de facto segregation, conformity pressures on middle man-
agement,88 pollution, or any other specific evil; if such specifics were
at stake one could neutralize their probative impact by recitation of
other particulars which are positive, beneficial and good -the wide-
spread private philanthropy in this country, open-ended upward mo-
bility, religious and economic freedom, even the "bourgeois" comforts
of central heating. Such a litany of social virtue is as irrelevant as any
litany of social vice. The goal of the new sensitivity and new conscious-
ness, Marcuse explains, "implies rejection of those policies of recon-
struction, no matter how revolutionary, which are bound to perpetuate
... the pattern of the unfree societies and their needs." 9 He means
that any reform which would ameliorate or remove many of the con-
temporary social evils is not the goal, for such reform would only
impede true progress toward a different system by making this one
more tolerable. The prisoner at the bar, he contends, has no redeem-
ing features and simply cannot be rehabilitated. Further, the trans-
formation must be total. Not socializing the means of production, not
changing national priorities, not reconciling the races - not any single
radical improvement is enough. Although useful, these are merely
88 Popularized in W. WHYTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956), acknowledged by Marcuse
in ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN xvii.
89 LmmEATION 86.
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piecemeal. They leave the essentials intact. For Marcuse, there must be
a substantial change in the entire social-economic-political-legal-
aesthetic-linguistic-biological-philosophical life of this society.90
Precisely because of the pristine, uncompromising absoluteness of
the Marcusean prescription, the burden of proof question becomes cru-
cial. Since his diagnosis is so pessimistic, it is natural to inquire how
deeply the physician has examined, what tests he has conducted, what
verification rules out contrary hypotheses, what is the recommended
surgery's price, and what are its chances for success. Indeed, so total
will be the operation's shock to the system, it is fair to ask whether the
physician or his colleagues of the same school can point to any prior
successes.
Lack of experience.
However the inquiry be framed, an essential element must be the
depth of Marcuse's experience of living in this society. And here the evi-
dence seems particularly weak. Although he occasionally introduces
some concrete examples, these are afterthoughts illustrating points al-
ready presumed "proved."91 The evidence consists largely of a lavish
sprinkling of quotations from French and German writers dealing theo-
retically with the problems of modem man, but only a few who phi-
losophize about concrete experience here. On a general level Marcuse
is familiar with numerous abstractions - "economic relations," "social
system," "alienation," - but on the practical level of specifics he reveals
that his witness is based on hearsay and second-hand information, for
he cannot discuss subsidiary institutions with any degree of familiarity.
Thus, if the topic is economics, he has predictable aversion to the "pri-
vate interests" and "corporate capitalism" 92 which prey upon the public;
and he asserts confidentially that central planning would unlock the
potentials of the technological society that the capitalists have inhibited,
resulting in rapid abolition of poverty.9 3 Such denunciations would
90 Id. chs. 1-2; see also Political Preface to H. MARcusE, EROS AND CrviLnZATION (1966).
91 ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 226-27. The lesson to be drawn from these examples -
riding in a new car, walking in a national park, riding in a subway- is ambiguous.
These experiences are open to other interpretations and are not the same in each person.
Marcuse's attempt to use trivia to "prove" important points is dissected brilliantly by
Vivas, supra note 2, at 65. For a more favorable approach, see Peretz, supra note 6.
Howe, supra note 2, at 86, observes of Marcuse's fact-consciousness: "Marcuse's work is
striking for its utter absence of factual material; he seems proud of his freedom from the
restraints of the empirical.... As'a result of this abstractedness, Marcuse soon evokes a
solipsistic universe in which he communes exclusively with his own self-confirming
categories."
92 LmERATION 76.
93 ONE-DIMENsIONAL MAN 251.
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carry more weight if their author could draw upon his own experience
with a company's inner workings, had empathized with the problems
of labor and management, had felt the tensions within the industrial
enterprise, and had dealt with the resistance to authoritarian direction-
from-the-top that human beings display in the face of all theories that
society can be run like an army. But Marcuse's life and vocation lay
elsewhere, in the academy, not the corporation; grappling with Hegel-
ian dialectic, not profit-margin or labor-management relation.
Despite this absence of personal experience with production prob-
lems, Marcuse should be esteemed no less as a thinker; but it is fair,
if one adopts that critical, negative sense of looking for the "alternative"
to the "given," to ask that the expert witness have some expertise upon
which to base those confident prophecies he so cavalierly gives the
reader. That Marcuse is a hostile witness to the present system of pro-
duction and distribution goes without saying; but that he should be
accepted without challenge as an expert witness becomes especially
questionable when we turn to the other side of the allegation, the as-
sertion that a centrally planned society could do the job much better)
Again, he has no experience to back up this assertion .94Discounting
the question - never answered - how such a "planned" society would
differ from the "administered" society he criticizes - recent experience
demonstrates that the most extreme efforts to "plan" a nation's economy
have failed.9 5 These failures are on record.96 The inferences drawn
94 See P. DRUCKxR, THE Nmv SocirTy: THE ANATOMY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ORDER 279-80
(1962):
[A] planned economy depends more on the proper discharge of the top-manage-
ment function and makes infinitely greater demands on its top management than
any other form of economic organization we know. We might say that a planned
economy rests on the proposition that management can be selected so as to be
perfect and infallible. Such supreme confidence in human perfectibility may be
forgiven people who, like most advocates of a "planned economy," have never
seen a management in action and have little idea how imperfectly and how fal-
libly it operates.
(Emphasis added.)
95 See Hearings on the Military Budget and National Economic Priorities Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, 958-61 (1969):
The Soviet economy, with its bureaucratic methods and irrational price struc-
ture, is wasteful of its resources. Capital is ill-applied and badly utilized.
Id. at 958.
e]he use of economic resources through investment has become progressively
efficient; or in other words, there has been a decline in the growth of out-
put obtained from each ruble of investment .. . the central planners still exer-
cise virtually all of the command functions . . . and it is precisely this inflexible
and topheavy rule that reinforces the inherent wastes ....
Id. at 961. See also E. LYONS, WoRKms' PARADISE LOST ch. 11 (1967); and the long series
by Shub, Russia Turns Back the Clock, The Washington Post, June 18 & 19, 1969, at A-i,
col. 1. These observations are confirmed by professional economists. See note 97 infra.
96 See E. ZALESKI, PLANNING REFORMS IN THE SOVIET UNION 1962-1966 48-93 (M. McAn-
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from that record may be rebuttable and some political theorists might
devise a scheme wherein the command economy would somehow avoid
bogging down in bureaucracy, waste, and political intrigue. However,
Marcuse does not attempt the task. This omission can only raise grave
doubts about his understanding of the workings of the political econ-
omy.
A similar misapprehension is visible in his offhand remarks about
law. As a Marxist, Marcuse's presupposition is akin to Marx's, that law
is at root a sham, a disguised method of covering an apparatus of repres-
sion with a veneer of legitimacy.0 7 Whether one focuses on the exploits
of Perry Mason or the encounters of real-life police and ghetto resi-
dents, such a view is understandable. But prosecutor and policeman
operate only within a narrow range of the law. If one believes that the
legal system is "repressive" because some laws or law-enforcers limit
autonomous freedom, he should, by the same token, admit that the sys-
tem is "liberative" because other laws and law-related forms protect
autonomous freedom and foster opportunity to live the humane life.
Thus, tort law protects the dignity of personality; contract law provides
a kind of "language of trade" whereby persons can voluntarily commit
themselves to certain costly engagements with the confidence of secured
return- and, in the process, create an overflow of value for others to
share; 98 corporation law creates new forms of property management
which engenders a multiplication of wealth shared by millions as users
drew & G. Nutter transl. 1967); THE SovImr ECONOMY (M. Borustein & D. Fusfeld eds. 1967)
especially chapters 22-24 dealing with the Liberman reforms. Marcuse's ignorance of the
real problems in central planning cannot be excused on the ground that these books
postdate One-Dimensional Man, for much of the data which Zaleski and others rely on
was extant before 1964. In any event, Marcuse's recent works make no reference to any
of the studies now available to him, nor do they retract an iota from his commitment to
central planning as a cure-all for world poverty. Yet the economic history of the Soviet
Union, from the time of the Liberman proposals in 1962, common knowledge as it is,
should at least be mentioned by one who teaches his students that the road to "liberation"
of the economy lies in collectivization and central planning. The comment alleging the
reason for opposition to central planning, at note 93 supra, is a gratuitous slur on anyone
who might sincerely disagree with him and is unsupported by any proof in his text.
97 For brief but incisive commentaries on some legal implications in the Marxist
analysis, see E. BODENHIMER, JumtRRUDENcE 79-81 (1967); FIRMDR C, supra note 53, at
143-53.
98 R. POUND, THE TAsK OF THE LAw (1944).
[There is a] demand of the economic order for certainty, uniformity, and stability
in the administration of justice, without which any high degree of economic de-
velopment is impossible .... [In societies without a web of reasonable laws,] one
cannot with safety do anything involving large expenditure of labor or money or
extending over a long period of time. With increasing complexity of affairs the
bad economic effects of lack of rule and uniformity in the administration of jus-
tice are more acute. The progress of civilization increases this complexity and de-
mands law, that is, system and order and rule in the administration of justice so
that men may act assuredly with reference to the future.
Id. at 17-18.
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of inexpensive products, recipients of dividends, and earners of wages. 99
Civil courts resolve conflict peacefully; administrative agencies attempt
to harmonize collective interests with an eye, at least, toward the public
interest; legislatures on every level from the local town council to the
United States Congress struggle with the task of managing a turbulent
and rapidly-changing society through the peaceful mechanism of law.
The power of the State itself is limited by the Constitution with such
crucial notions as "due process of law" and "freedom of speech," a limi-
tation which is no small achievement in an era which witnessed the
Gestapo, the K.G.B., and the Red Guards. The goal is to liberate the
individual for life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The web of
institutions which we all take for granted is so largely dependent upon
law for structure, harmonization, and protection, that none of us could
fulfill his own needs for a week -whether food, clothing, shelter or
education, association, religion or self-government - without continual
reliance upon the life-support system, i.e., the environment of law.
The legal system attempts to be even-handed, and thus extends its
assistance even to its critics, such as Professor Marcuse: it will enforce
his contract to teach, protect his person, and see to it that the royalties
on his books are paid. It secures his freedom to travel and to speak. It
protects him against powerful persons who may resent his success or
object to his point of view - a protection the legal system of his home-
land was too weak to accord him in the 1930's. Marcuse's distaste for
the laws which impede radical transformation of the system is under-
standable; nonetheless, the suggestion even as an inference, that the
legal system is, as a whole, repressive of human personality bespeaks an
unfamiliarity with the realities of law and its role in our lives.100
Rhetorical Legerdemain
A rhetorical device which enables quick transit from assertion of
the evils of the present social order to assertion of the essential evil of
that order itself, and correlatively, to the insistence that the order must
be completely changed in a "qualitative" way is Marcuse's unique use
of analogy and word-redefinition. He is quite willing to attribute to
words which are crucial for his analysis - such as "impoverishment,"
"enslavement," "domination," "violence," "aggression"'10 
- an expan-
99 W. LIPPMANN, THE GooD Society (1943): "The whole of it, all property, and every-
thing which we include in the general name of private enterprise, is the product of a le-
gal development and can exist only by virtue of the law." Id. at 273. This book is not an
argument for laissez faire.
100 See note 57 supra.
101 For instance, in One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse admits that he changes the mean-
ing of words, although he attempts to put the onus of redefinition on others:
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sive meaning their original, common and everyday use does not import.
Thus, in a passage generally critical of automation he speaks of a "kind
of masterly enslavement . . . not essentially different from that of the
typist, the bank teller, the high-pressure salesman... and the television
announcer. ' 10 2 In a description of Western technological society, he
says "[t]he instruments of productivity and progress, organized into a
totalitarian system, determine not only the actual but also the possible
utilizations ... domination functions as administration... [when] the
administered life becomes the good life of the whole [we have] the pure
form of domination.' 1 3 An Essay on Liberation states that "violence
is built into the very structure of this society: as the accumulated ag-
gressiveness which drives the business of life in all branches of corpo-
rate capitalism, as the legal aggression on the highways, and as the na-
tional aggression abroad .... 104
Marcuse's method is, generally, to take a word which primarily
describes concrete, almost palpable, relationships, instances of which
one could watch happening before his own eyes -the impoverished
beggar lying in a Skid Row gutter, the lynch mob violently seizing its
prey -and transfer it, the relationships it summarizes, and their con-
notations to abstract relations which thereby assume much of the same
immediacy and reality possessed by the concrete analogue. The pejora-
tive nuances associated with the concrete action or relation also carry
over to the abstract. At root, the method appears to be argument from
One must insist on the inner connection between the Marxian concepts of ex-
ploitation and impoverishment in spite of later redefinitions, in which impover-
ishment either becomes a cultural aspect, or relative to such an extent that it
applies also to the suburban home with automobile, television, etc. "Impoverish-
ment" connotes the absolute need and necessity of subverting intolerable condi-
tions of existence, and such absolute need appears in the beginnings of all rev-
olution against the basic social institutions.
ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 26.
Though this device is commonplace throughout the books under consideration, space
here permits inspection of only a few key instances. Thus, "impoverishment" normally
means "reduced to poverty" and connotes physical deprivation, absence of material neces-
sities, etc. "Enslavement" suggests physical domination under which a person is treated
like a chattel and even in its secondary meaning, as stating a general relationship of one-
way compulsion- "He was a slave to that drug"-strongly implies lack of volition, de-
basing treatment, helplessness, harm to the "slave." Similarly, "totalitarian" in modern
times is a descriptive term for dictatorial governments which through unrestrained power
attempt to control every significant facet of their subjects' lives, against their will, utiliz-
ing raw police-military force to insure compliance. Again, "violence" is commonly assod-
ated with iough or random physical force in action; "aggression" with the purposeful and
unjust offensive attack on another individual or nation. These definitions are based on the
Random House AieMacAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY (Random House ed. 1962); however, that
they substantially comport with contemporary usage can be demonstrated by appealing
to the reader's personal experience with the language.
102 ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAm 25.
103 Id. at 225.
104 LBERAnON 75-76.
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analogy, a technique as old as literature itself, but one fraught with
occasions for fallacy. The writer can assume the very point to be proved:
that because some characteristics in the well-known concrete example
recur - or seem to recur - in the abstract analogue, all characteristics
so recur, and the interrelationships also are replicated, as, finally, are
the moral judgments evoked. Thus the slave-owner "dominated" his
slaves, and the technological society "dominates" its subjects. The ambi-
tious businessman is as "aggressive" as the drivers on our highways, and
so also the Vietnam foreign policy. The moral judgment anyone would
pass upon slavery or a war of aggression is, by the simple transfer of the
word, wrenched out of its appropriate context and levelled at a pattern
or activity where, without the surreptitious insertion by analogy, it
would require far more proof than the writer adduces. "Such arguments
introduce assumptions in a metaphorical guise," one commentator on
logic has noted, "in which they are not readily detected or easily criti-
cized. In place of analysis they attempt to identify their position with
some familiar symbol which will evoke a predictable, emotional re-
sponse in the reader."'10 5 Marcuse's method enables him to knock down
convenient straw-men without stating the distinctions in the concepts
he is merging. And so "administration" becomes "domination," which
turns into "enslavement," which at last emerges as "totalitarian." And
somewhere along this winding road, some members of the party have
disappeared and some have joined the troupe: for instance, the fact of
the consent of the people to the basic institutions of society, possibly
implicit in the relatively non-pejorative word "administration," has
disappeared, to be replaced by the innuendo of popular helplessness
in the face of the "totalitarian" Leviathan. The enslavement of a by-
gone era, with its cat-o'-nine-tails and chains for enforcement, with its
endless hours of unrewarded human toil, Marcuse discerns covertly
present in the media, behind the apparatus of technology and within
the forms of social experience. Under Marcuse's alchemy, words
undergo a Doctor Jekyll-Mr. Hyde transformation.
Now it is quite true that he does not rely merely on metaphorical
devices to make his case; and that our society does manifest numerous
structural evils along with a shallow materialism that deserves his evan-
105 See Davis, Logic and Logical Fallacies, in CONTEXTS FOR CoMPosmoN 96 (S. Clayes
S. D. Spencer eds. 1965). The reader may wonder at the many meanings of the word "ag-
gression": how is centralized "aggression," if such it be, in a war akin to discrete and in-
dividualized driving habits on a highway? And what does the latter have to do with eval-
uating a society, since one could probably find as many careful, or even hyper-cautious
drivers, as truly "aggressive" ones? See also Nutting, Newspeak 1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 131(1970).
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gelistic critique. But in his eagerness to move from the particular to
the universal, the rhetorical condemnation goes beyond the evidence
and assumes a meaning to words and an application of them to given
realities which is the whole issue to be proved. Effective as the discourse
may be on the speaker's rostrum, one cannot prove this society "totali-
tarian" simply by calling it such, and then adding a few arguable
examples of repression. The logical task of proving a democracy to be
"totalitarian" is really quite complex.100
106 If one would show that the United States is "totalitarian" he must show that it
is "like" Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia, since these are the two modem and familiar
examples from which the word draws its meaning. Such a demonstration entails convinc-
ing the reader (a) that the relationships in this society are identical to, parallel, or are
(at least) "like"- another analogy- those in Germany and Russia of that era, and (b)
that there are no significant differences which could spoil the resemblance between them.
See W. FEARNSIDE & W. HOLTHER, FALLACY: THE CouNTERFErr OF ARGUMENT 22-27 (1961).
Such an enterprise entails a standard of comparison and exclusion as well as articulation
of how one judges the weight to be given to comparative factors.
In the example at hand, in Germany and Russia these factors, among others, must
certainly be significant: (a) elitist control through a single "party"; (b) secret police com-
prising a "state within a state" and unrestrained by constitutional inhibitions or court
supervision; (c) intense, one-sided propaganda; (d) systematic violent eradication of real
or potential adversaries of the regime; (e) absence of legal forms to distribute and trans-
mit power through predictable and generally accepted structures; (f an implicit com-
mand-theory of government that likens the leadership's role to the general staff of an
army; (g) a psychology of suspicion that assumes that anyone who fails to show outward
enthusiasm for the regime's every policy is therefore disloyal; (h) deterioration of the laws
to the level of arbitrary edicts; (i) breakdown of subsidiary institutions (trade unions,
church groups, business associations) to the point that they are absorbed by and become
an arm of the State itself; (j) general mismanagement of the economy which can be
cured only by a war psychology that can unite the people against a common outside
enemy; (k) the emergence in the leadership of a single, all-consuming goal: to stay in
power at all costs (at the price of other, more traditional governmental goals, subsumed
in the phrase, "to serve the people'); (1) the public "purging" of scapegoats on trumped-
up charges to instill popular loyalty and turn popular discontent at a visible target on
whom all wrongs can be blamed; (m) censorship and book-burning as part of a general
campaign to discredit the heroes and practices of the memorable past and substitute a
future-orientation in popular aspirations as a distraction from the ideas and comforts of
the remembered past and from the sufferings of the present; (n) pervading all the fore-
going a ruthless thoroughness and wanton denial of the classic forms of "due process of
law." See generally R. CONQUEST, TBm GREAT TEaOR: STALIN'S PURGE OF THE Tmnrzts
(1968); W. Ssnana, THE IaSy AND FALL OF TaE Tfuw REICH 268-76, 937-94 (1960). Aware-
ness of many of the foregoing in Germany moved Churchill to observe that "conditions
in Germany bore no resemblance to those of a civilized state." 1 W. CHURCHILL, THE SEC-
oND WoRL WAR 91 (1948). A chief cause of such barbarism is the total breakdown of
the Rule of Law.
These are some of the major characteristics of totalitarianism. Surely if the contem-
porary society is "totalitarian" it would exhibit most of these qualities, especially those
associated with arbitrary power by a lawless elite group directly controlling the State for
its own purposes. Marcuse does make some generalized comparisons: thus the media "con-
trol" our thoughts, the Law impedes radical change, the consensus on technological insti-
tutions is akin to one-party rule; he admits there are some significant differences (of form,
if not of content) too: "Our society distinguishes itself by conquering the centrifugal so-
cial forces with Technology rather than Terror, on the dual basis of an overwhelming
efficiency and an increasing standard of living." ONz-DiiaENSIONAL MAN x. The same ter-
ror-technology difference is stated at 227. But the issue at stake, which he does not take
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Utopianism
Marcuse's vision of the "Alternative" society is so totally beyond
experience that it can only be called utopian. This is not the simplistic
stricture that his alternative itself is "no place," does not exist, and so
does not deserve our efforts; for neither did any improvement of the
human condition when first conceived. Rather, the objection is three-
fold. First, the goal is so vague that one cannot know where Marcuse is
leading him; yet, in an age so vitally concerned with "truth in packag-
ing" and consumer protection, the buyer should have more to inspect
than glittering generalities about the performance of the product
labeled "total transformation of society." 10 7 Second, the price is unclear.
The student purchasers of the new society are told only that the price
will be high and the installments continuous; 08 moreover, delivery is
not guaranteed. If delivery is made, no warranty promises that the prod-
uct will perform as advertised; in fact, earlier models attempted in this
century did more harm to their users than good. Since the designer is
in no position to stand behind the product, the consumers must be
content to let the losses fall on themselves and the rest of society if the
product does prove a failure. Third, (dispensing with the parallel to
consumer protection) Marcuse erects an abstract ideal and then judges
concrete realities against it; when these present realities are found want-
ing, he does not inquire whether the infinite gap between ideal and
reality is due to the present's imperfection or the future's impossibility.
Yet the method is essentially unfair, for the actual can never compete
with the possible and always stands condemned by comparison. Al-
though the utopian ideal, if specified, can attract, it should not be the
sole standard of judgment. Marcuse goes the prophets of old one better:
they judged an evil society against norms their listeners themselves knew
they could emulate if they tried; Marcuse judges against norms only
the angels would recognize.
up, is the significant differences between each two instances; e.g., the way and the extent
to which the media "control"- again an analogous word- how completely the Law
stops "radical change," whether it is at all accurate to liken a diffuse acceptance of insti-
tutions to one-party domination. Is there no real difference between a regime that "dom-
inates" by technology and one that rules by terror?
107 ONE-DIMENSIONAL Mm 234: "Industrial society possesses the instrumentalities for
transforming the metaphysical into the physical, the inner into the outer, the adventures
of the mind into adventures of technology." Id. And "the Logos of technics would open
a universe of qualitatively different relations between man and man, and man and na-
ture." Id. at 235.
108 See Vivas, supra note 2, at 57: "Marcuse has nothing to say about the price in
blood and pain that the eradication of our society would entail .. The price? [It] will
be high, we need not doubt."
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The Unwarranted Leap from Epistemology to Polity
Marcuse assumes that conceptual relations and the process of ar-
riving at a "higher" truth have their exact counterparts in the political
world. Thus, if thought is a process of "negating" the given, social
progress is a process of negating the present social order. If thought
progresses through "contradiction," so then must those who want social
progress stand against, oppose, "contradict" the present order. If
thought moves necessarily to "higher" stages and somehow subsumes
in a comprehensive synthesis what truths lay on the "lower" levels, so
social change - if "radical," i.e., contradictory enough - -will neces-
sarily lead to a "higher" or better society. The fallacy is to confuse
Hegelian metaphysics with political realities. Since the two orders of
existence really are different, their "laws" too will be different. What-
ever the mind's process in struggling toward truth, experience shows
that most social progress has come through cooperation, itself perhaps
a kind of harmonization-of-opposites, but still by no means the total
clash implied by Marcuse. Moreover, the more one "descends" to the
practical world of politics and economics, the more he finds many al-
ternatives, all standing over-and-against the given to a certain extent,
and yet all somewhat realizable. The relations are not a matter of
formal logic, with formal all-or-nothing inclusions and exclusions, but
ones of practical compromise. Further, the assumption that the "alter-
native" will necessarily be "better" in the social order because it is
"higher" in the conceptual order is not borne out by experience.
Certainly Nazi Germany "radically negated" the Weimar Republic that
preceded it, but it was not a "higher stage of history." Retrogression,
stagnation, and gradual forward progress - all hard to analogize to
the process of thinking - are social realities. Society is living, turbu-
lent; its dynamisms are not readily conceptualized by a metaphysics of
progress-by-negation. One is compelled to wonder whether Marcuse is
subject to the same critique he leveled at the positivists: Is he a prisoner
of his own method?
III
PoLiTiAL DUE PROCESS AND THE RuLEs oF THE GAmiE
The cryptic phrase, "the rules of the game," suggests what more
elegantly may be called "political due process." Its central notion is
the conviction that the process of making public policy decisions is more
important than the given content of any one particular decision itself,
so much more important, indeed, that on balance a polity will be better
19701
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off even if it should make the wrong decision the right way than should
it make the "right" decision the wrong way.1 9 Behind such a paradox lie
some judgments about man and the nature of society which, inferen-
tially, Marcuse rejects. First, political due process is flavored with a
Humean skepticism: for Mill, no one is infallible about politics and
economics; thus it is dangerous to close off debate and freeze the current
doctrine or approach into permanent acceptance.1n Not only is it quite
possible that some weakness in the policy has not been considered, but
it is practically certain that changed conditions in the future will
necessitate modification - and such change will be highly difficult if
not impossible if the spokesmen for potential changes are silenced or if
the channels of effecting change - the decision-making processes them-
selves - are closed. This skepticism about certainty is not shared by
Marcuse, for whom the "radical alternative" is the only "other" and is
so clearly better that anyone who opts for change within the status quo
lacks either good faith or good sense, or has forfeited his right to a voice
in the making of policy because technological domination has warped
his judgment.
Another judgment underpinning the rules of the game: since no
one is infallible and yet decisions must be reached, it follows that in
political affairs only an approximation of perfection can be attempted.
In other words, each decision must be open-ended - subject to emen-
dation - because human judgment is such that no "totally right" or
"eternally correct" position can be taken. Consequently, the possibility
of correcting a given policy-decision must always be built into that
decision itself."'i Thus, the democratic policy-maker is, as it were, always
"distracted": he keeps one eye on the task at hand, the issue presently
being fought, but he must keep the other on the method of accomplish-
ing that task, on the rules of the fight. Besides the positive value in such
a dual concern - the chance of winning the vote tomorrow that he loses
today - it also avoids a crucial negative result, i.e., the substitution of
naked force for agreed-on standardized methods. For when a given
result is sought above all else, above even the methods of realizing that
109 See Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of 1954: A Proposed Legal-Political
Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. Cm. L. REv. 173 (1956): "In other words, because the dem-
ocratic method of settling conflict keeps open the avenue of change so that wrongs may
be righted peacefully, the citizens of a democracy have a greater stake in this method of
settlement than in any particular outcome of any particular conflict." Id. at 191. Despite
the application the cited article makes of this principle, as a principle it should hardly
be controversial.
11oJ. MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 40, at 25: "All silencing of discussion is an as-
sumption of infallibility."
III See the comment of George Sabine at note 37 and accompanying text supra.
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result, the classic ends/means problem of social ethics becomes acute:
partisans on all sides of the issue are forced to act as if the end justified
the means - if only to survive.
However, if procedure be held in higher esteem than the immedi-
ate, substantive result, it provides a common ground among contesting
factions, a basis of cooperation when future power-shifts modify the
roles of the currently victorious and vanquished, and a subtle face-
saving device for the loser, who can convince his followers that he did
all he could under the circumstances, i.e., under the rules. A political
leader's constituency, or his rivals within the ranks who abide by rule-
imposed restraints, will be much less demanding of instant success than
those who use power as their only norm, and will impose on the leader
fewer pressures in a given case, thus giving him time to maneuver
through peaceful channels. Moreover, by limiting what the victors can
do to the vanquished by reprisals - both being under the rules - de-
feat does not mean destruction for any party. This is no trivial feat,
considering the sham that is lawmaking in the total dictatorship, where
the substantive goal of keeping power is infinitely more important to
the elitist power-holders than any "mere" procedure and where, con-
sequently, dissidents dare not criticize for fear they will be deemed a
threat to that overriding goal's continual realization by the infallible
leadership. By disarming one's adversary (and oneself) - permitting
only nonviolent means of effecting substantive results - the commit-
ment to procedural due process in politics minimizes reliance on force
and violence by redirecting conflict into calmer channels. It thus
achieves a "substantive result" far more profound and far-reaching than
any particular measure: the civilizing of the contestants themselves.
Whatever the real weaknesses of some of our present political proce-
dures, to enshrine immediate result over long-range process as all-im-
portant is retrogressive. It enfeebles a civilized system at its very heart
and purpose: its ability to correct mistakes nonviolently. Nevertheless,
Marcuse reverses the commitment to the integrity of the general pro-
cedure and insists that substantive results are all-important.
OTHER BENEFITS OF POLITICAL DUE PRocEss
Process is impersonal. Substantive "results" are usually personal:
they are blamed on or credited to individual persons, and individual
political leaders identify, in their people's minds and often in their
own, with the results. Commitment to procedure over substance helps
remind those who share the commitment that the Maximum Leader
is not everything; it helps remove "personality" somewhat from the
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enterprise of governing, both by subjecting the governor himself to
rules even he must obey, and by providing continuity and permanence
to a society which would otherwise be stamped by the personality of
the Leader and even chronicle its past in terms of "his" era, e.g., in
Russia, the "Stalin era." Then too, it enables those who went before to
contribute their own wisdom to the settling of affairs in the present, at
least to the extent that the forefathers established the procedure which
binds the descendants and thus structures the manner in which the
latter will approach their problems. Among many that could be ad-
duced, the separation of powers and the method of constitutional
amendment are two outstanding examples of the Founding Fathers'
participation in our current governance in the United States.112
Reverence for the rules of the game makes change take longer.
Sheer power can effect changes by shortcut means that "get the job
done" no matter who is trampled. It is true, of course, that undue
concern for the form of action, as the common-law pleading demon-
strated before modern reforms, can be an obstacle to attaining the just
substantive result that the forms were originally devised to facilitate.
But as long as there are openings for justified change, as long as the
channels do at least reach the sea, then our impatience for instant up-
heaval - because our side happens to have the power or the image to
carry all before it -is misplaced. The orderly, step-by-step procedures
retain their importance: they admonish us that in many instances gov-
ernment cannot entirely right the wrongs it denounces, that old prac-
tices have an inertia of their own, that people cannot be "put in their
place" as one would arrange the papers on his desk, that in the nature
of things changes may be rapid but improvements come slowly, however
hurried the improvers. 113 "The errors and defects of old establishments
are visible and palpable," wrote Edmund Burke in 1790; "it calls for
little ability to point them out; and where absolute power is given, it
requires but a word wholly to abolish the vice and the establishment
112 1 do not suggest that a procedure is good just because it is old; but the reverse
may be true, that it is old just because it is good and has survived the tests of time. One
could hardly fault Holmes for observing that it is "revolting to have no better reason for
a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV," Holmes, The Path
of the Law, reprinted in INmRODUCrIoN TO LAw 50, 62 (1965), though there is great differ-
ence between a rule of law from medieval England and a method of self-governance from
Federalist times. The modest purpose of the paragraph accompanying this note is merely
to suggest a few ways that procedural due process helps decision-makers to get a better
perspective of the immediate task at hand, by helping them somewhat transcend both
personal ambitions and historical myopia induced by the immediacy of their specific prob-
lem, goal or crusade.
118 Of course, even the most socialist of nations will not satisfy Marcuse because it
has not undergone the "qualitative" "transvaluation" he envisions.
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together."11 4 To the objection that reform which preserves what is
good in the old order, while injecting needed changes in what is evil, is
too slow and might take up many years, Burke answered:
Without question it might; and it ought: It is one of the excel-
lencies of a method in which time is amongst the assistants, that
its operation is slow, and in some cases almost imperceptible....
Political arrangement, as it is a work for social ends, is to be only
wrought by social means. There mind must conspire with mind.
Time is required to produce that union of minds which alone can
produce all the good we aim at. Our patience will achieve more
than our force."15
Finally, adherence to the rules of the game reminds the players of
the kind of enterprise they are embarked on: the self-governance of
free men. If society is to resemble a Spartan army, conceivably orders
can issue from the top to settle things, though the average infantryman
will be unhappy and the intermediate officers will grumble. But if
society as a whole is to be attuned to its members' needs, it must pro-
vide opportunity for them to express those needs. This mandates free-
dom of speech: dialogue among the members and, as Adolf Berle has
observed, dialogue between the members and the power-holder.1 6 In
today's society this multifaceted dialogue is at times slow and often in-
conclusive; a number of reforms are necesssary. But frequent delay is
no reason to exchange a glacier, if such it be, for a steamroller.
Tns JURISPRUDENCE oF RuLE-REFusA
Marcuse teaches his followers to refuse to play the game by the
rules, contending that any cooperation with the political system is
wrong. Behind such an uncompromising position lie two philosophical
premises. Marcuse never articulates them specifically; rather they are
implicit throughout his writing on the method of achieving radical
social change in a democratic society. First, a political movement will
be "tainted" even by procedural cooperation with a society it would
substantively change; second, substantive goals and procedural means
are so intertwined that one's adherence to certain means will foreclose,
perforce, the possibility of achieving some necessary results. I believe
he is mistaken on the first premise, but may well be correct on the
second. The questions deserve examination.
To ask whether the movement will be tainted by operating within
114 E. BuRKE, REFLEcTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 238 (Regnery ed. 1962).
115 Id. at 239.
116 A. BERLE, supra note 60, at 115-42.
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the forms of democratic procedure is not to ask whether it will succeed
- for that is the second question. Although the concern about purity
may befit a religious movement as a matter of principle, it may not be
appropriate for a political movement. It will not assist in achieving the
designated goal. Still, avoidance of contamination-through-cooperation
may be used as a defense mechanism to insulate the neophyte from
having his faith shaken by outside contact. It helps maintain his sense
of isolation (and often, resentment at isolation). Without living, ex-
periential contact with that political system which he feels oppresses
him- except possibly in the dimension of police law-enforcement-
he can conjure up various visions of abuses, plots, schemes that the
Powers - "They" - are planning, while remaining secure in his nega-
tive faith that "the channels are closed," that no means within the sys-
tem can effect change. Since the follower of Marcuse wants to believe
that American legal and political processes do not work, he does not
want to encounter them working.
One of the great threats to the Marcusean faith is that the com-
municant will discover that many of the world's ills stem not from
some abstract entity called "the System" but from individual misun-
derstandings and pure human "cussedness." Indiscriminate contact with
the outside world would reveal to him the twin facts that any system
can be oppressive if it is abused, and that many persons in this system
are using its viable procedures to improve it. The concern about "taint"
is, in some contexts, insurance against second-thoughts; it is also an
effective protection against encountering the actual complexity of social
life and political decision-making. The person who "refuses his service"
to the status quo and so defines himself as "outside the realm of law"
even before some actual conflict with legal mechanisms is hardly
likely to exercise the patience needed in using legal forms to accom-
plish social goals. Even, for example, in such relatively simple decision-
making forums as a zoning board hearing or a school board budget
briefing, the demands on a partisan are great; to learn the facts, to
prepare a case, to study the statute, to consult with others, to attend
the hearing itself, to argue his point, and other chores of a good advo-
cate, all "take too long." The self-defined "outlaw" prefers to disguise
his inexpertise by declaring the legal forms inadequate, and "taint"
those who use them. His ignorance and impatience have locked him
into his own narrow a priori outlook. Yet, a mere glance at recent
history, toward which he is often as disdainful as he is toward political
due process, would serve to remind him how unnecessary is this self-
imposed isolation: the history of the Socialist movement in both Europe
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and the United States eloquently attests to the possibility of accepting
the democratic legal framework while "keeping the Faith" in one's
substantive goals.
Secondly, a Marcusean radical cannot cooperate with democratic
forms because they impede attainment of his substantive goal." 7 In-
sistence on set procedures, such as affording the opposition an oppor-
tunity to speak; voting on a given matter only when a constitutional
quorum is present; obeying written laws until they are changed by
test-case court ruling or legislative action; insisting that decisions
(whether judicial or legislative) be made only after notice, hearing, and
opportunity to rebut; insures a kind of balancing process whereby
extreme views are usually tempered, what was of value in the past is
separated from the dross and preserved for the future, and proponents
of overturning long-standing practice are forced to scrutinize their
plans carefully and to justify them in detail.118 In terms of accomplish-
ing revolution, it may be that the "rules of the game" are "rigged" -
though the term is unfairly pejorative -in favor of the status quo,
for they establish an apparatus wherein persuasion, not violence, is
(supposed) to be the basic means toward achieving power. Persuasion
requires that the speaker frame a convincing case, state it to his con-
stituency, and abide by their decision on its merits. The rules also
require that he listen to their "feedback," field their questions, handle
their criticisms, and accord to competitors the same respect he demands
for himself. Finally, if he would succeed, he must strike a responsive
chord in his audience either in terms of their interests or their idealism.
Although the system rarely works as well as this summary model would
suggest, it does at least force both candidate and elector to articulate
and to justify (often imperfectly it is true) their desires. Reasons clash
with opposing reasons, and because few advocates so dominate the
debate that everyone follows, some minds are changed but some adhere
to their original views. And since most men have something they would
like to preserve and are wary of trading a known present good for an
unknown future good- which they fear might also be evil - it be-
comes, as a practical matter, impossible for a revolutionary operating
within a parliamentary structure to persuade a majority to follow his
lead. Finally, the revolutionary seeks a total change, and, consistently,
117 The fact that the democratic process provides for the redress of grievances
and for legal and lawful changes does not alter the illegality inherent in an
opposition to an institutionalized democracy which halts the process of change
at the stage where it would destroy the existing system.
LiBERATION 66.
118 E. BurnK, supra note 114, at 238-45.
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demands not only total power to accomplish his end, but also total free-
dom from the procedural limitations imposed upon that power by the
parliamentary system. The abuse of power being a hallmark of the
twentieth century, men are uneasy in the face of such demands and,
unless stirred by some impending; or recent cataclysm, a majority is
almost certain to choose a more "moderate" program. The procedures
provide men with an opportunity to achieve change without revolution
- in some measure, the best of both worlds. Thus, Marcuse correctly
asserts that when these procedural structures, which encourage a non-
revolutionary result, are wedded to technological affluence, the general
populace simply does not "see" the need for total upheaval. By making
evolution possible, the procedure deepens their disinterest in revolu-
tion. The result is success for a candidate or movement which in com-
parison to the radical-revolutionary is "conservative," though the new
program may be quite "radical" compared to its own predecessor.119 At
root, then, Marcuse's complaint about the "rules of the game" is an
admission that to play the game means to lose it. He does not consider
the possibility that the loss may be due not to bad rules but to bad
coaching.
Ti ASSUMPTION OF INFALLIBILITY
In rejecting the "rules of the game," Marcuse implicitly rejects the
reasons for them. He states, in effect, that the "alternative" which is
"wholly other" is so important to achieve - now - that the process of
changing society gradually through open debate is irrelevant. His view
of what is wrong with society and what must be done to correct it is the
only right one;120 his view is in itself so cogent that if it were not for
the oppressive atmosphere of the totally-administered society it would
119 Not "truly" radical, of course, for those who would "reject society as a whole."
The kinds of "progress in civilization" Marcuse approves are stated in Repressive Toler-
ance at 107-08: "The English civil wars, the French Revolution, the Chinese and the Cu-
ban Revolutions .. " Pretermitting the question whether these four instances are truly
analogous, it should be noted that the verdict on the latter two is still to be rendered,
and in the judgment of some scholars the price of "progress" has been terribly high. See,
e.g., A. BARN=r, COMMUNIST CHINA IN PERSPEcTivE (1962):
The plastic surgery that the Communists have been performing on Chinese soci-
ety for over a decade has been painful indeed for millions of Chinese, in a psy-
chic as well as a physical sense. The price in terms of economic austerity, over-
work, rigid political control, and unprecedented regimentation has been extremely
high. The entire twelve-year period [1948-1960] has been one of almost contin-
uous struggle, tefision, and uncertainty in China....
Id. at 40. It is easy to rhapsodize about a revolution one has not lived through.
120 In an article generally sympathetic to much of Marcuse's analysis (though opposed
to his solution), one writer compared his approach to the dogmatic righteousness in the
historical Church: "The price of tolerance for the right and the true is intolerance for
the wrong and the false. (Catholics have heard this before: 'error has no rights.)" Calla-
han, supra note 4, at 380. This is the best popular article I have seen on the question of
political due process in Marcuse.
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easily command acceptance. But in the present context, the game being
rigged against the radical analysis and prescription, the people cannot
really decide what is best for them. On the assumption that "the game"
is rigged, the procedural protections sketched above are to be jettisoned
in return for an activist censorship board which will protect people from
whatever is "repressive," including words that promote warfare instead
of welfare, and even thought that inhibits "liberation" - all as defined
by the Marcusean elite itself. At the core of this extreme skepticism
about the possibility of free speech in modem society is both Marcuse's
puzzlement that people do not seem to see the world as he does and
the assumption that therefore they must be bereft of all critical faculties.
Thus, he ignores popular concern about the role of the media, 121 dis-
misses the influence of the radical press, and overlooks the widespread
political ferment that so distingiushed the 1960's. Eyes riveted on the
rocks ahead -"the whole... period is one of clear and present dan-
ger"' 22 - he does not notice that the Ship of State is veering onto a
different course. For Marcuse, the end - "liberation" - does justify
the means - repression of opinion which dissents from his own. The
supposition, infallibility of his radical analysis, is unstated but never-
theless necessary to the argument; and the wisdom of those who will
decide who is nonprogressive, when and how to "withdraw tolerance"
from them, and what opinions may be tolerated is taken for granted.
Finally, that the debate will deteriorate to violence as final arbiter is
assured; since "repressive tolerance" cannot occur in a society given to
procedural due process, so the silencing of wrong, i.e., non-liberating,
opinions cannot occur without destroying the structures that encourage
the marketplace of ideas, and these structures are, in the final analysis,
the same rules of the game that inhibit violence. Marcuse does not
flinch from the logical conclusion.
"LIBERATING VIOLENCE"
For Marcuse, the ethical judgment on the use of violence is based
on factors other than the violence itself, i.e., on who does it and what
is the result.
In terms of historical function, there is a difference between rev-
121 Expressed at least as early as the publication of W. LrPPMANN, THE PUBLiC Pm-
LOSOPHY 99 (1955): "For the modem media of mass communication do not lend themselves
easily to a confrontation of opinions. The dialectical process for finding truth works
best when the same audience hears all the sides of the disputation." Lippmann was aware
of the difficulty of giving a hearing to "the alternative"; keeping in mind Mlill's advocacy
of free speech as the necessary political method, he offered recommendations far more
realistic than Marcuse's. The problem is also discussed in A. Bmrix, supra note 60, at
327-31.
122 Repressive Tolerance at 109.
1970]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
olutionary and reactionary violence, between violence practiced by
the oppressed and by the oppressors. In terms of ethics, both forms
of violence are inhuman and evil - but since when is history made
in accordance with ethical standards: To start applying them at the
point where the oppressed rebel against the oppressors, the have-
nots against the haves is serving the cause of actual violence by
weakening the protest against it.123
Since violence is a feature of all existing regimes - "even in the ad-
vanced centers of civilization, violence actually prevails" - and since
law in today's society is institutionalized violence, while it may be
prudent for the powerless to refrain from violence in the face of the
powerful, it is hardly ethically necessary; nonviolence "is a necessity
rather than a virtue.' 24 Thus Marcuse disdains the Gandhi-King type
of nonviolent resistance movement. 25 Granted Marcuse's premises, his
position is logical enough; and as a tactician he does show some feel
for current political realities. While admitting that the time is not ripe
for upheaval, he states that "resistance at particular occasions, boycott,
nonparticipation at the local and small-group level may perhaps prepare
the ground.' 26 The ease with which Marcuse recommends that his
youthful followers justify violent means with the rightful ends they
pursue is consistent with his premises. But the life of society is not
merely logic. When one contrasts the violence of the modern revolu-
tionary with the so-called "violence" Marcuse attributes to society
under the rule of law, he wonders, once again, whether we have an
instance of misplaced analogy, of Marcuse's personal lack of experience
with law as a nonviolent means of conflict-resolution, 27 or perhaps,
simply a lack of adequate reflection on the relation between creativity
and violence.
Power is ethically neutral: it can be good or evil, applied in good
or evil ways, for good or evil ends. For power to be creative or liber-
ative, it must be applied rationally; yet violence is irrational. Creativity
follows and uses natural patterns, as the composer of a symphony works
within the necessities of harmony, as the poet obeys the commands of
123 Id. at 108.
1241d. at 102.
125 British scholar Maurice Cranston makes this explicit judgment. See Cranston, su-
pra note 87. Along with Marcuse's writings he cites his lecture promoting the "demys-
tification of violence" at the London Conference on the Dialectics of Liberation in 1967.
Id. at 47.
126 Repressive Tolerance at 101. In Liberation, he approves the stages of "enlighten-
ment prior to material change -a period of education ... which turns into praxis: dem-
onstrations, confrontation, rebellion." LIBERATION 53.
127 Cf. H. BEam AN& W. GREINER, THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW pts. 1 & 4
(1966).
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rhythm and rhyme. But violence is random; it shatters natural patterns.
It is the axe swung into the composer's piano, the ink smeared over a
poet's manuscript, the grenade tossed into a shop in Saigon or Tel Aviv.
Creativity is a thousand years of culture accumulating at Dresden or
Monte Cassino; violence is a night bombing-raid that sweeps it all
away, leaving only pock-marked earth, smoking rubble, and crippled
children with tears in their eyes. In itself, violence cannot create, for it
is power used irrationally. But indirectly, the selective, rational appli-
cation of certain kinds of power can be a creative force. The surgeon's
scalpel, the parent's measured discipline of his child, court orders care-
fully drawn to achieve a specific result - these and hundreds of other
examples demonstrate that the threat or actual use of measured force
for a rightful purpose and (especially with regard to law) within pre-
scribed clearly understood rules of general application is ubiquitous in
human affairs and is essential for a rational society.
But there is an infinite difference between the measured force the
law brings to bear and the indiscriminate violence of the revolutionary.
The law deals with individuals, struggling to maintain reason, and
making careful distinctions - e.g., among accident, negligence, inten-
tional tort, strict liability; between murder and the degrees of man-
slaughter; between substantial and incidental contract violations, and
in some jurisdictions even between comparative degrees of negligence.
The revolutionary, as prosecutor, judge and executioner - of a prede-
termined, indiscriminate sentence against a whole class of people - has
no time to make rational distinctions. How can a Molotov cocktail
hurled at a draft board or a bomb planted in a New York skyscraper
avoid the innocent and harm only the guilty? When a judge signs an
injunction prohibiting socially damaging conduct, he specifies clearly,
in detail and at great length, after a fair hearing to determine facts, what
cannot be done; when a revolutionary would "enjoin" his less enlight-
ened brethren from conduct not approved by him. he sets up barricades
or throws rocks. Just how close to barbarism men are, when they fail
to distinguish between rational force and random violence, when they
begin to rhapsodize about "creative violence" or "violence as the mid-
wife of a new society," has been strikingly illustrated in the conduct of
the famous dictators of our troubled era. 28 But Marcuse neither adverts
to these theoretical distinctions nor seems to remember the historical
128 See W. Smnan, supra note 106, especially sections on the "Roehm Purge" and the
concentration camps; R. CONQuEsr, supra note 106. As for Lenin, see D. Smm, LrrIN 156-57
(1953), describing the execution of fifteen hundred political prisoners by his Secret Police
Chief, Dzerzhinsky, who "misunderstood" Lenin's orders.
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examples. In his concern to bring about a better world even if the price
be violence, Marcuse is a man of great hope; yet "there is often a
monstrous incongruity between the hopes, however noble and tender,
and the actions which follow them. It is as if ivied maidens and gar-
landed youths were to herald the four horsemen of the apocalypse."' 29
CONCLUSION
The foregoing pages have described two different spiritual uni-
verses. I fear the gap between them is unbridgeable. Building that
bridge would be only an academic exercise if Marcuse were just an-
other academic. But he has had hundreds of readers and thousands of
followers, doubtless among them some of the best intellects the present
generation can boast, most of them quite enthusiastic about their vague
goal of "liberation" and a good many quite committed- or at least
resigned - to the "necessity" of violence to achieve it. Thus, they chal-
lenge those who would defend the tradition of reasonableness in hu-
man affairs to defend it by reasons which will convince the doubters.
Those who accept the tradition of reason must demonstrate the harm
that will befall society should it follow Marcuse's prescriptions, and
must prove the continued viability of the tradition of Burke and Mill,
and not the Jacobins; of Locke and the Federalists, and not the Encyclo-
pedists; of America's historical experience, and not Hegel's historical
abstractions. The violence already pervading this society and decried
by Marcuse attests both to the failure, in some measure, of the tradition
of free debate and to the continued widespread presence of the arbitrary
in human affairs. Such an ill can be cured gradually, but not by the
alternate kind of violence Marcuse urges. As the American Civil Liber-
ties Union has aptly observed:
To abandon the democratic process in the interests of "good causes"
is to risk the destruction of freedom not just for the present but for
the future, not just for our social order but for any future social
order as well. Freedom, the world has learned to its sorrow, is
a fragile plant that must be protected and cultivated.13 0
129 E. HOFFm, THE TRuE BELmEvER 20 (1951).
130 American Civil Liberties Union, Statement on Campus Disorders, at 2 (1969)
(mimeo).
